Cadeby Pit Disaster of 1912

Home Office Inquiry

Final Report

The Final Report prepared by Mr. R. A. S. Redmayne, C.B. his Majesty's Chief Inspector of Mines, on the causes of and circumstances attending the explosions which occurred at the Cadeby Main Colliery on July 9th 1912, was published by the Home Office in May, 1913.

The Report began with a reminder of how the disaster occurred, during the King's visit to the Yorkshire Coalfields, and as the result of 2 explosions 88 persons lost their lives, 35 by the first and 53 by the second explosion, including the Rescue Party, in which were associated three of his Majesty's inspectors. The report gives an elaborate description of the colliery and the method of working, and an exclusive summary of the evidence of the 24 witnesses who were heard.

In his conclusions, Mr. Redmayne, traces with minute care, the place and origin and the direction of the first explosion and the point where it seems to have developed, and then proceeds as follows:

As to the cause of the explosion, I think the fire which originated some years ago in the neighbourhood of the fault has never been completely eradicated, but gave occasional evidence of its existence, and that as the coal was worked off against the fault, a great cavity formed, both fire and cavity keeping pace with the extraction of the coal, that an incipient explosion had occurred previously, on January 20th, 1912, and that the conditions of affairs on Monday night provided just the combination of circumstances necessary to cause an explosion on a more extended scale - the effective sealing off of the exit from the fire area, but the failure to seal off the inlet, allowing an accumulation of an explosive mixture, and a vent for the consequent explosion. That Mr. Chamber's instructions were well conceived for effectually sealing off the affected area, and were of the nature set out in an earlier part of this report, I believe to be the case, but I do not believe that these instructions were carried out in their entirety. Who blundered I do not know. Mr. Bury, being dead, cannot appear in his defence. I refrain from attaching blame to any one in particular.

As to the exact route taken by the second explosion, Mr. Redmayne said that there was no evidence, but upon that point he stated:

It may be that there was a large accumulation of gas on the 'rise' side of the district after the first explosion, which igniting at the fire, burnt more or less quietly up and down the face until an explosive mixture was formed, when it detonated. The force in 14 level was very much greater than in the first explosion. The greatest evidence of burning was along the face also. The flame in the second explosion extended nearly to the end of 14 level, or it may be that, seeing that the purest and consequently the most dangerous coal dust undoubtedly existed at the face, the explosion followed that route in consequence. Had it extended far on to the plane, I think it would be probable that the whole colliery would have been wrecked by a great explosion,

Mr. Redmayne added that the facts were eloquent testimony to the value of an inert dust - acting as an adulterant to the coal dust - as a preventative to the spread of a colliery explosion.

Rescue Operations

Turning to the question of the rescue operations, the Chief Inspector said:

I have formed a decided opinion in respect of the rescue operations. Whilst there was provided at the colliery as fine a body of men trained in rescue work, as one could wish to see, the organisation at the mine on the occasion of these explosions was most defective. When Mr. Whitty made his arrangements at the surface he should have issued instructions prohibiting the descent into the mine of all persons unprovided with a written authorisation to do so. He should have placed a guard at the outbye end of the south plane to prevent the entry into that district of unauthorised persons from other parts of the mine. Had this been done, the loss of life occasioned by the second explosion would, I am sure, have been much less heavy.

The further question as to whether the work of recovering and bringing out the bodies should have been undertaken at this stage, is one in respect of which there will doubtless be differences of opinion. I have no doubt on the point. I know that sentiment weighs heavily in the consideration of a problem of this nature, and that there is an intense desire on the part of relatives of the dead to see and bury the bodies. I do not think however, that the management of a colliery is justified in allowing persons to risk their lives in order to recover bodies.

I should also remark that great difficulty was experienced in obtaining a correct number of casualties; this was not ascertained for 3 days after the disaster owing to the indiscriminate issue of lamps after the 1st explosion. This was a regrettable incident, and one which emphasizes the necessity of strict discipline.

The rest of the report touched on a variety of matters. A very decided opinion was expressed that pending the complete isolation by stowage and stoppings, all the men not engaged in combatting the fire should have been withdrawn from the district.

As to the causes of spontaneous combustion, evidence was given by Mr. W. H. Chambers and Mr. J. K. R. Wilson, but Mr. Redmayne would not express an opinion, as a departmental committee was carrying out a report on Spontaneous Combustion in Mines.

In the concluding paragraph, Mr. Redmayne recorded his sense of the magnitude of the loss which the Mines Department had sustained in the deaths of Mr. Tickle, Mr. Hewitt and Mr. Pickering. Of Mr. Pickering he added that the country had lost one of its most able and devoted public servants.

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